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ABSTRACT. Managers make important corporate strategic investment decisions such asmergers
and acquisitions to improve the long-term competitiveness of their organizations; while at times
they may be forced to manage for the short-term in order to satisfy the demands from the stock
market. However, there is a lack of empirical research to examine the short- versus long-term view
ofmanagementdecision-making.This studyanalyses themergersandacquisitionsactivities in the
hospitality industry andparticularly, investigatesdelisting behaviour of publicly traded hospitality
firms andwhether companies exhibit distinct patternsbefore delisting. Consolidation is prevalent
in a maturing industry such as hospitality which currently faces a fiercely competitive global
environment. The results of the study show that there is substantial differencebetween hospitality
and non-hospitality stocks: notmuch information leakage in the delisting of hospitality stocks and
a marked increase in institutional holdings with time but significant information leakage in non-
hospitality stocks as reflected by positive and significant abnormal returns.
INTRODUCTION
World Travel & Tourism Council TSA
Research Report (2013) estimated that the
tourism industry’s economic contribution,
directly and indirectly in 2012 was over $1.3
trillion or 8.6% of the national GDP and the
industry currently employs more than 14
million workers, or 10% of total U.S. employ-
ment. This implies that hospitality and tourism
industry is one of the major income and
employment generating industries in the U.S.
Thus, it is critical to study the financial
characteristics and performance of securities
in this important industry.
Corporate acquisitions have become one of
the crucial strategic weapons to achieve instant
growth in the hospitality industry despite the
fact that some companies have experienced
declining post-acquisition performance that has
reduced shareholder wealth (Sirower, 1997;
Borde, Byrd, & Atkinson, 1999). Abe Tarasofsky
(1990) determined that approximately 40% of
acquired firms experience improved perform-
ance, approximately 40% experience deterior-
ating performance, and approximately 20%
experience no change in performance. In a
study using stock market and accounting data
examining the impact of industry concentration
through acquisitions, he concluded that acqui-
sitions are not a particularly good way to
promote corporate efficiency. Kim and Arbel
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(1998) found that acquisitions have had a
significant influence on the structure of the
hotel industry today. Decades ago, indepen-
dent hotel chains were more prominent, today
large public corporations dominate the lodging
industry. This is due to the large number of
consolidations, mostly via mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&A), that have taken place.
This study analyzes the events in the
context of hospitality stocks and compares the
results with that of the general market and this
would provide additional information about
the characteristics of hospitality stocks. This has
strong implication for the management of
hospitality companies. Specifically, this study
is significantly different from the finance and
hospitality literature in several ways: (a) the
study covers all hospitality stocks (hotels and
restaurants) listed in NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ; (b) the study period is from 1981
to 2010, a relatively longer period of
investigation compared to prior studies; (c)
the study examines the delisting of hospitality
stocks; (d) this study sheds light on the impact of
institutional investors on hospitality stocks as
institutional investors become increasingly
important source of financing for hotels and
restaurants seeking to expand; and (e) the
study addresses the issue of information
leakage in the event study as it is one of the
most interesting events documented in the
finance literature (Brown, Harlow, & Tinic,
1988). This study analyzes this event in the
context of hospitality stocks and compares the
results with that of the general market and
provides additional information about the
characteristics of hospitality stocks. This has
strong implications for the management of
hospitality companies.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Pros and Cons of Consolidation
Combining two separate organizations into
a larger corporate entity has brought both
benefits and problems. McCann (1996) ident-
ified seven major benefits that acquisitions
provide service companies: (a) increased
market share, (b) increased capacity to offer
new products/services, (c) improvements in
brand & reputation, (d) improved efficiency in
resource allocations, (e) increased scale econ-
omies, (f) an enlarged asset base, and (g)
acquisition of management expertise.
Similarly, acquisitions have brought advan-
tages to hospitality companies operationally.
A public hotel company gains instant increase
in revenues from acquiring existing properties
than building new hotels; provides quick entry
into new geographical regions and new market
segments, such as Marriott’s entry into the Asian
upscale hotel market through its purchase of
Renaissance Hotels; or even facilitate entry into
related businesses such as gaming. Additionally,
consolidation is good because there are so
many fixed costs associated with operating
hotels. In addition to traditional benefits-
including lower overhead, larger companies
can operate in a more cost-efficient manner
and invest more capital in operations. The
benefits include pooling resources of the
acquiring and acquired companies, reducing
redundant staff, enhancing purchasing
power, sharing loyalty programs and improving
marketing efforts through combined customer
databases and reservations systems (Nigro,
1998).
On the drawbacks, hotel companies run the
risk of making their chains overly homogenous,
and of sacrificing quality and hospitality as they
grow bigger. For this reason, some customers
have becomemore attracted to boutique hotels
such as Kimpton Group. As is true with mergers
and takeovers in any business, hospitality
industry has its share of problems, in terms of
personnel and assets that no longer fit.
Consolidation in the Hospitality
Industry–The Last Thirty Years
Content analysis of the published articles
regarding mergers and acquisitions activities/
transactions for the last three decades as the
hospitality industry has evolved was conducted.
Data on acquisition and merger activities in the
hospitality industry was obtained from the
quarterly publications of Mergers and Acqui-
sitions from 1980 to 2010. We found that M&A
46 W. K. LEUNG ET AL.
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activities in hotels were not significant until the
mid-eighties.
1980s
By the 1980s, the hospitality industry
started to show signs of maturity with lower
customer count. It was experiencing intense
competition with limited growth potential.
Operators faced the challenge of increasingly
competitive operating environment. For them,
the only viable method of expansion was
perhaps through acquisition of a competitor as
opposed to greensite development. This period
also reflected a more disciplined approach to
expansion through acquisition. Generally, the
1980s were favorable for M&A activity due to
reasons such as the economic and political
conditions under the Reagan administration,
especially its pro-industry tax; and interest rates
that were more conducive to acquisitions.
According to Tse and Crawford-Welch (1989),
in the 1980s integration (across the marketing
channel) was the underlying strategy for most
corporations. The theme for acquisition activity
was characterized by service companies buying
other foodservice companies, and diversification
within one’s own industry (Waters, 1984;
Anonymous, 1988). Prominent examples
included Saga (acquired Grandy’s and Spoon’s
which allowed the company to enter into
growing segments of upscale chicken and
gourmet hamburgers) and R. J. Reynolds
Industries. For instance, Horizontal integration
(where a competitor buys out another compe-
titor) peaked during the 1980s with deals like
Denny’s Inc. acquiring El Pollo Loco; Godfathers
Pizza acquiring Pizza Ventures, Inc.; Marriott
Corp. acquiring Howard Johnson Co., etc.
Vertical integration, on the other hand, was
unsuccessful in the hospitality industry. The
example of Allegis (which ownedUnitedAirlines,
Hilton International, Westin Hotels, and Hertz
Rent-A-Car) divesting itself of the hotel and rental
car businesses in order to re-focus on its core
business of airline management shows that in
some industries end-to-end solutions for custo-
mers was not effective or desirable.
1990s
Most consolidations in the 1990s were by
hotel groups buying up brands in market
segments where they were weak, allowing them
to offer a broader range of accommodation types
(Canina, 1996; Cohen, 1999). Real estate
investment trusts (REITs), tax efficient U.S.-based
property companies, invested heavily in the U.S.
hotel industry during this period. For example, of
the 15 real estate deals valued at $1 billion or
more in 1998, 7 were from the lodging industry
(Beals & Arabia, 1998; Bergsman, 1999). This
caused a re-structuring of the industry with the
emergence and prominence of REITs (Zhang &
Deng, 2010) such as Starwood, Patriot American,
Felcor, and Host Marriott. Established hotel
brands such as Sheraton (Starwood acquired ITT,
owners of the Sheraton chain), Westin, Inter-
continental, Doubletree, and Ritz-Carlton were
all absorbed by mega chains seeking dominance
in the hotel market. Consolidation and multiple-
tier strategies have resulted in extended brand
families for the top lodging companies. The
economies of scale, particularly on the systems
side, assure that acquisition and consolidationwill
continue in the lodging industry. Also, acquisitions
have become lucrative for shareholders of the
target hospitality companies and this has attracted
investors who in the past have had no interest in
public real estate companies.
Another phenomenon occurring in this
decade which changed the industry is the
separationof hotel ownership fromhotelmanage-
ment. Strategically, Marriott Corp. divested its
debt-laden hotel properties through a spin-off
while maintaining management contracts to the
same hotels under its flag. Thus the traditional
owner-operated hotels were replaced by hotels
owned by insurance companies and other
syndicates of investors and operated by large
international hotel chains. This strategy delivered
to shareholders simultaneously the value involved
in hotel real estate investment and the value
accruing from the management of the hotel
business (Cohen, 1999).
2000s
In the new millennium, the impact of
globalization and the internet is more visible
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 47
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than ever. The hotel industry has experienced
major M&A transactions, like the reunification of
Hilton, and major disasters, from 9/11 and SARS
to tsunamis and hurricanes. Globalization of the
hotel industry has intensified with operators
competing in various corners of the world to
expand into new, fast-growing markets and key
gateway cities in established regions of theworld.
These companies enter new territory by
acquiring a local property or regional company.
In the United States, most of the consolidation
occurred within the real estate investment trusts
and management companies (Kim, Gu, &
Mattila, 2002; Kim, Mattila, & Gu, 2002; Strauss
& Scoviak, 2006). The hotel companies have
become more sophisticated in terms of better
financial structures, strict discipline in negotiating
deals and unexpected levels of operational
flexibility. The forces of consolidation can be
revealed in the ranking by the Hotels’ 325. For
example, in the late 1980s there were about 30
companies that oversaw 66 brands. With
consolidation, the number of companies has
reduced to only 9 for the samenumber of brands.
That is, more and more hotel brands are under
fewer, larger corporate umbrellas. The big four
(Starwood, Hilton, IHG, and Marriott) continue
to dominate the industry. Along with Wyndham
International, their combined portfolios include
more than two dozen hotel chains and the
challenge has been to maintain each chain’s
individuality and identity. Accor acquired Red
Roof Inns and All Season Hotels and caused its
room inventory to increase by 21.6% to 300,000
rooms. Hilton Hotels acquired Promus Hotel
Corp. because the company had to remain big
enough to compete with other large American
operators like Starwood (which acquired Le
Meridien in 2005; Mollenkamp, 2005) and
Marriott. In 2003, Six Continents became
InterContinental Hotel Group (IHG), and Cen-
dant became Wyndham Worldwide. The major
operators sold off assets in the hot market as they
continued to emphasize management contract-
ing over the more traditional owner-operator
model (Sanders, 2005). International expansion
became a strong trend. For chains like Marriott
International, 70% to 80% of their 2005 growth
was outside of the United States. Asia became a
hot market. Hoteliers were maximizing their
performance through aggressive yield
management.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data Collection
The study focused on hospitality stocks
listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from
1980 to 20101, according to their SIC (Standard
Industrial Classification) codes, in Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP, University of
Chicago) tape. The following two sectors by
their Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
code are included: (a) Eating And Drinking
Places (2-digit SIC ¼ 58, hereafter “Eating”)
and (b) Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps,
And Other Lodging Places (2-digit SIC ¼ 70,
hereafter “Hotel”). Adjusted stock return with
distributions, shares outstanding and market
capitalization (equal to closing price * shares
outstanding) data are also from CRSP tape.
Shares outstanding and market capitalization
are the last available figures in the second
quarter of each year. Institutional investor data
(number of shares held by institutional investors
in each quarter for each company) was
obtained from Spectrum 3-13 (f) Institutional
Stock Holdings Survey.2 (Computer Directions
Advisors [CDA] provides the Spectrum tapes
that contain the institutional investor data). For
each stock the institutional percentage was
obtained by dividing the number of shares held
by institutional investors by shares outstanding.
Table 1 shows the institutional percentages of
stocks in the two sectors from 1980 to 2010.
The number of hospitality stocks listed in
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ increased from
1981 to 1997 but then started to decline,
1. 2011 COMPUSTAT tape has complete data as current as
2010 only.
2. The Spectrum 3-13(f) survey is derived from reports filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by
institutions (including banks, insurance companies, investment
companies, investment advisors, pension funds, endowments,
and foundations) with combined assets exceeding $100 million.
The survey contains institutional data for every quarter of each
year starting from 1979.
48 W. K. LEUNG ET AL.
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probably due to mergers and acquisition
within the hospitality industry. This suggests that
the U.S. stock market boom in the 1990s
occurred in the hospitality industry as well.
Institutional Investors
What is more interesting is that the
percentage of stocks that have no institutional
investors was close to 35% (41 divided by 118)
in 1981 but the percentage dropped to 0% (0
divided by 83) in 2010. Institutional holdings
(shares held by institutional investors divided
by shares outstanding) also registered a marked
increase from 7.8% in 1981 to 58.8% in 2010.
Chan, Leung, and Wang (2003) studied the
impact of institutional investors on Monday
Effect and reported that the percentage of
institutional investors is basically monotonically
increasing from 1980 to 2010 for the general
market. This marked increase in institutional
holdings may be beneficial to all shareholders
of firms because institutional investors tend to
be more active shareholders. The activism of
institutional shareholders helps reduce agency
costs because they closely monitor the
performance of corporate management. Smith
(1996) documented, for example, that the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS) targeted 51 firms between 1983 and
1993. Seventy-two percent of the targeted
companies after 1988 settled with CalPERS by
adopting proposed changes or made changes in
their corporate governance. Firms that adopted or
settled exhibited increases in shareholder wealth
and those that resisted changes exhibited
decreases in shareholder wealth.
This also has strong implications for the
hospitality industry. The distribution of insti-
tutional holdings in the hotel industry shows
that it had a higher percentage increase over
the same period compared to the general
market (64.2% – 8.6% ¼ 55.6%). By attracting
more institutional investors, hospitality stocks
could also benefit from an increase in share-
holder wealth documented above. Institutional
investors also bring more funding for existing
operation and expansion because they are
capable of buying large numbers of bonds and
stocks issued by companies. Institutional
investors also play important roles in debt
financing. Elgonemy (2002) reports that insur-
ance companies, pension fund companies and
retirement systems financing is an important
source of debt financing in the lodging industry.
Moreover, institutional investors would bring
more liquidity to the stocks too (Hong & Stein,
1999). With this increase in liquidity, investors
have a reduced risk in investing in hotel
companies and this in turn will attract more
investors. Furthermore, institutional investors
will also help dampen the volatility of stock
return because they are more experienced and
sophisticated investors and will tend to over-
react less. The results show that this may be one
of the most important reasons why hospitality
stocks change from momentum stocks in the
1980s to price reversal stocks in the 1990s.
The authors obtained the delisting dates and
codes from the 2011CRSP tape.We only studied
stocks with delisting codes between 201 and 232
(they are stocks when merged, shareholders
primarily receive common stock or ADRs) and
delisting codes between 301 and 332 (they are
issues exchanged, primarily for another class of
common stock). These stocks are then named
stocks of mergers and acquisition and exchanges.
The stocks of mergers and acquisition and
exchanges are interesting because they will just
become another listed stock after delisting dates.
If there is any abnormal return around delisting
dates, these abnormal returns would reflect
leakage of information about the stock they will
exchange into.
The Market Model
The customary market return model
measures the abnormal returns for the event
window as
ARit ¼ Rit 2 Rmt ð1Þ
where Rit is a vector of event window returns
and Rmt is a vector of market return at time t.
The excess returns are aggregated across
securities, given the sample of N events,
defining ARt
* as the sample average of N
abnormal returns for the event window:
AR*t ¼ average of ARit for i ¼ 1 toN ð2Þ
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The Beta Model
We also obtained risk adjusted return (RAR)
data from CRSP which is derived from beta
values calculated by the methods described by
Scholes and Williams (1977).
The abnormal returns at day t using beta for
the event window is:
ERit ¼ Rit 2 RARt ð3Þ
where RAR is the risk adjusted return using beta
from CRSP.
AERt is the sample average of N abnormal
returns for the event window:
AERt ¼ average of ERit for i ¼ 1 toN ð4Þ
To test the null hypothesis that the average
excess return (AR*t and AERt for day t) is equal
to zero, we use the test statistic, which is the
ratio of the average excess return of day t to its
estimated standard deviation.
We use the event study methodology
proposed by Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay
(1997). The delisting day is day 0. For each
security, we choose a 31-day event window: 30
pre-event days and the event day.
EVENT STUDY RESULTS
Table 2 provides the abnormal returns using
equations 2 and 4 above for day 25 to day 0
(we report only results for days 25 to 0 because
of space. Results for day 26 to 230 are
available upon request).
Table 2 shows the mean and t statistics for
the AR* in equation 2 (CRSP value weighted
return) and the AER in equation 4 (CRSP beta)
for hotel and eating places stocks and all stocks
listed in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ except
hotel and eating places stocks (non-hotel and
eating places). The results show distinct
differences between the hotel and eating places
stocks and non-hotel and eating places stocks.
The abnormal return for hotel and eating places
stocks are either not significant and if they are
significant, not of consistent sign. On the other
hand, the abnormal returns for non-hotel and
eating places stocks are consistently positive
and significant. As the stocks studied here are
going to be exchanged into another stock, the
positive and significant return is reflecting
leakage of information about the stocks to be
exchanged into.
But why do hotel and eating places stocks
behave differently from the general market
(non-hotel and eating places stocks)? Table 3
shows the mean institutional investor ratio
(equal to shares held by institutional investors /
shares outstanding) and market capitalization of
the two groups of stocks. The mean institutional
investor ratio and market capitalization of hotel
and eating places stocks are lower than that of
non-hotel and eating places stocks. As insti-
tutional investors are professional and sophis-
ticated investors, they would be able to spot
information which is private and thus able to
out-perform the general public. Table 4 shows
the monthly turnover (monthly transaction
amount in dollar terms) and the increase in
purchase of institutional investors in dollar
terms in the quarter the delisting occurred. The
mean monthly turnover of non-hotel and eating
places stocks is $137.2 million in the month of
delisting, substantially higher than the $62
million for hotel and eating places stocks. The
average increase in purchase by institutional
investors of non-hotel and eating places stocks
is $78.3 million, higher (though not signifi-
cantly) than the $65.1 million of hotel and
eating places stocks. It seems this difference in
abnormal return is related to the substantial
difference in monthly transactions of the two
groups of stocks which are probably related to
the increase in purchase of institutional
investors.
In Table 5, we show the difference in
abnormal returns between hotel and eating
places stocks and non-hotel and eating places
stocks when we rank the stocks into low and
high institutional investor ratio.
Table 5 shows that the abnormal returns for
non-hotel and eating places stocks are mainly
positive and significant from days 25 to 0 (event
day)while those for hotel and eatingplaces stocks
are either not significant or inconsistent in signs.
Table 6 shows the difference in institutional
investor ratio and market capitalization. For low
institutional investor ratio, the institutional
investor ratio of non-hotel and eating places is
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higher than that of hotel and eating places.
Similarly for market capitalization, the market
capitalization for non-hotel and eating places is
$535 million, significantly higher than the $95
million of hotel and eating places. For high
institutional investor ratio, the institutional
investor ratio of non-hotel and eating places is
significantly lower than that of hotel and eating
places. Similarly for market capitalization, the
market capitalization for non-hotel and eating
places is $1.834 billion, higher than the $1.615
billion of hotel and eating places.
As shown in Table 7, when institutional
investor ratio is low, the monthly turnover of
non-hotel and eating places is significantly
higher than that of hotel and eating places.
Moreover, the increase in purchase of non-
hotel and eating places is also significantly
higher than that of hotel and eating places. This
suggests that turnover and increase in insti-
tutional investor purchase may explain the
difference in abnormal return in Table 5.
However, for higher institutional investor ratio,
the difference in turnover and increase in
institutional investor purchase between hotel
and eating places and non-hotel and eating
places are not significant.
In Table 8 we show the difference in
abnormal returns between hotel and eating
places stocks and non-hotel and eating places
stocks when the stocks are ranked into low and
high market capitalization.
Table 8 shows that the abnormal returns for
non-hotel and eating places stocks are mainly
positive and significant from days 2 5 to 0
(event day) while those for hotel and eating
places stocks are either not significant or
inconsistent in signs. Table 9 shows the
difference in institutional investor ratio and
market capitalization. For low market capitali-
zation, the institutional investor ratio of non-
hotel and eating places is higher than that of
hotel and eating places. Similarly for market
capitalization, the market capitalization for
non-hotel and eating places is $51 million,
significantly higher than the $33 million of hotel
and eating places. For high market capitaliza-
tion, the institutional investor ratio of non-hotel
and eating places is lower than that of hotel and
eating places. However for market capitaliza-
tion, the market capitalization for non-hotel
and eating places is $1.975 billion, significantly
higher than the $1.144 billion of hotel and
eating places.
As shown in Table 10, when market
capitalization is low, the monthly turnover of
non-hotel and eating places is higher than that
of hotel and eating places. Moreover, the
increase in purchase of non-hotel and eating
places is also significantly higher than that of
hotel and eating places. This suggests that
turnover and increase in institutional investor
purchase may explain the difference in
abnormal returns in Table 8. For higher market
TABLE 3. Difference of Institutional Investor Ratio (IIR) and Market Capitalization (in mkt cap, $ million) Between Hotel and Eating Places
(hotel) and Non-Hotel and Eating Places From 1980 to 2010
Mean IIR
for hotel
Mean IIR for
non-hotel and
eating places
Difference
of IIR
t-stat for
difference
of IIR
Mean mkt
cap for
hotel
Mean mkt cap for
non-hotel and
eating places
Difference
of mkt cap
t-stat for
difference
of mkt cap
0.2374 0.2463 20.0089 20.23 622 1,161 2539 21.98**
*Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed t-test. **Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed t-test.
TABLE 4. Difference of Monthly Turnover (in $ million) Institutional Investor Purchase (purchase, in $ million) Between Hotel and Eating
Places (hotel) and Non-Hotel and Eating Places From 1980 to 2010
Mean
turnover
for hotel
Mean turnover
for non-hotel and
eating places
Difference
of turnover
t-stat for
difference
of turnover
Purchase
for hotel
Purchase for
non-hotel and
eating places
Difference
of purchase
t-stat for difference
of purchase
62.0 137.2 275.2 22.54** 65.1 78.3 213.3 20.33
*Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed t-test. **Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed t-test.
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capitalization, the monthly turnover of $233.3
million of non-hotel and eating places stocks is
significantly higher than the $114.6 million of
hotel and eating places stocks though the
difference in increase in institutional investor
purchase between hotel and eating places and
non-hotel and eating places is not significant.
Table 11 shows the difference in abnormal
returns between hotel and eating places stocks
and non-hotel and eating places stocks when
we divide the time into two periods: 1980 to
1995 and 1996 to 2010.
Table 11 shows that the abnormal return for
non-hotel and eating places stocks are mainly
positive and significant from days -5 to 0 (event
day) while those for hotel and eating places
stocks are either not significant or inconsistent
in signs. Table 12 shows the difference in
institutional investor ratio and market capitali-
zation. For 1980–1995, the institutional
investor ratio of non-hotel and eating places is
significantly higher than that of hotel and eating
places. Similarly for market capitalization, the
market capitalization for non-hotel and eating
places is $329 million, significantly higher than
the $97 million of hotel and eating places. For
1996–2010, the institutional investor ratio of
non-hotel and eating places is lower than that of
hotel and eating places. However for market
capitalization, the market capitalization for
non-hotel and eating places is $1.622 billion,
higher than the $955 billion of hotel and eating
places.
As shown in Table 13, for 1980–1995, the
monthly turnover of non-hotel and eating
places is significantly higher than that of hotel
and eating places. Moreover, the increase in
purchase of non-hotel and eating places is also
significantly higher than that of hotel and
eating places. This suggests that turnover and
increase in institutional investor purchase may
explain the difference in abnormal return in
Table 11. For 1996–2010, the monthly
turnover of $199.7 million of non-hotel and
eating places stocks is significantly higher than
the $99.4 million of hotel and eating places
stocks though the difference in increase in
institutional investor purchase between hotel
and eating places and non-hotel and eating
places is not significant.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HOTEL
INDUSTRY
Looking at the restaurant and hotel merger
waves during the thirty-year period some
underlying threads are discernible. First, in
both the restaurant and hotel acquisitions many
TABLE 6. Difference of Institutional Investor Ratio (IIR) and Market Capitalization (mkt cap in $ million) Between Hotel and Eating Places
(hotel) and Non-Hotel and Eating Places From 1980 to 2010 by Institutional Investor Ratio
Institutional
Investor Ratio
Mean IIR
for hotel
Mean IIR
for non-
hotel and
eating places
Difference
of IIR
t-stat for
difference
of IIR
Mean mkt
cap for hotel
Mean mkt
cap for non-
hotel and
eating places
Difference
of mkt cap
t-stat for
difference
of _mkt cap
Low 0.0679 0.0726 20.0047 20.4 95 535 2440 24.66**
High 0.5564 0.4331 0.1234 2.45** 1,615 1,834 2220 20.31
*Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed t-test. **Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed t-test.
TABLE 7. Difference of Monthly Turnover (turnover, in $ million) Institutional Investor Purchase (purchase, in $ million) BetweenHotel and
Eating Places (hotel) and Non-Hotel and Eating Places From 1980 to 2010 by Institutional Investor Ratio
Institutional
Investor
Ratio
Mean
turnover
for Hotel
Mean turnover
for non-hotel
and eating places
Difference
of turnover
t-stat for
difference
of turnover
Purchase
for Hotel
Purchase for
non-hotel and
eating places
Difference
of purchase
t-stat for
difference
of purchase
Low 2.2 53.9 251.7 23.18** 0.7 5.4 24.7 24.94**
High 174.5 226.5 252.0 20.71 129.5 124.5 5.0 0.06
*Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed t-test. **Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed t-test.
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small chains often opted to be absorbed by
larger chains in order to grow. Second,
horizontal integration, popular in restaurant
acquisitions in the eighties, became popular in
hotel brand mergers in the nineties. Third,
whereas diversification was a dominant theme
in restaurant acquisitions, consolidation was
dominant in hotel acquisitions. Finally, while
historic undervaluation of restaurant stocks was
a key driving force in stimulating acquisitions,
this was not the case for hotels. At the height of
acquisition activity in the nineties hotel
companies, on the average, had better than
average price/earning (P/E) ratios. Industry
analysts anticipate that the next downturn in
economy would only accelerate consolidation,
as companies would have to maintain size
to survive. The number of hotel sector
transactions during the period has served to
focus attention on the widely held belief
that future profitability is being driven by
scale. It now seems clear that the international
market, led by the North American hotel
groups, will be dominated by a few super-
groups. The emergence of Starwood has been
dramatic and it has highlighted the true
challenge that REITs pose to “traditional” hotel
groups. Others that have emerged in the super-
group category include Marriott International,
Hilton, and, Intercontinental Hotel Group The
underlying trend of emerging super-groups
raises a number of interesting issues for the
industry as a whole. The industry expects
more consolidation, but at a slower, more
deliberate pace. Some even predict that the
hotel industry will have four or five major
companies dominating, as is the case in the
airline industry.
With the many hotel companies that are
now publicly traded the equity markets and
investors have become more aware of hotel
companies and their potential profitability.
Hotel executives must now develop and adjust
operating strategies in response to demands by
Wall Street. The short-term focus that has
characterized the stock markets in the past will
lead to pressures on hotel companies to
continue to grow profits annually. On the
upside, the involvement ofWall Street will force
hotel executives to be more efficient and
productive in operations by controlling costs
and creating new sources of value for share-
holders. Indeed this will require more sophis-
ticated and talented pool of tourism
management graduates in the future with skills
to deliver what Wall Street wants.
TABLE 9. Difference of Institutional Investor Ratio (IIR) and Market Capitalization (mkt cap, in $ million) Between Hotel and Eating Places
(hotel) and Non-Hotel and Eating Places From 1980 to 2010 by Market Capitalization
Market
capitalization
Mean IIR
for hotel
Mean IIR
for non-
hotel and
eating places
Difference
of IIR
t-stat for
difference
of IIR
Mean mkt
cap for hotel
Mean mkt
cap for non-
hotel and
eating places
Difference
of mkt cap
t-stat for
difference
of mkt cap
Low 0.0566 0.1332 20.0766 25.89** 33 51 218 23.02**
High 0.3973 0.3292 0.0681 1.23 1,144 1,975 2831 21.70*
*Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed t-test. ** Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed t-test.
TABLE 10. Difference of Monthly Turnover (turnover, in $ million) Institutional Investor Purchase (purchase, in $ million) Between Hotel
and Eating Places (hotel) and Non-Hotel and Eating Places From 1980 to 2010 by Market Capitalization
Market
capitalization
Mean
turnover
for Hotel
Mean turnover
for non-hotel
and eating
places
Difference
of turnover
t-stat for
difference
of turnover
Purchase
for Hotel
Purchase
for non-
hotel and
eating places
Difference
of purchase
t-stat for
difference
of purchase
Low 2.5 3.6 21.2 20.84 0.2 1.3 21.2 211.23**
High 114.6 233.2 2118.6 22.24** 92.1 115.8 223.7 20.42
*Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed t-test. ** Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed t-test.
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The structure of the industry has also
changed permanently. Today there are clear
distinctions between hotel developers, hotel
owners, management companies, REITs, and
hotel franchisors. This has reduced operational
risks for hotel companies in some cases and
caused them to be more focused in defining
what business they are in. It has enabled
companies to leverage their corporate strengths
into pursuing what they do best: development,
ownership, or management. Finally, hotel
companies must now invest time and resources
into generating new ideas that lead to share-
holder value creation and profitability. Because
capital resources will be allocated to those
industries that offer more attractive returns such
as technology and internet stocks if hotels fail to
consistently deliver growing profits.
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